When we consider the problem of external threats to Russia, we could disregard the threat of “international terrorism”. Yes, this threat is certainly there, but doing it to please fashionable western concepts, that terrorism is the main threat - we completely lose touch with reality.
Furthermore, fighting against terrorism needs very specific powers, means and methods. A regular army that is trained and equipped to fight against another regular army isn't the best solution fighting with terrorism: Chechen, Iraq and Afghanistan wars have proven that point several times.
Successful fight against terrorism is carried out by special force units and an army that can offer tactical support sometimes (Heavy armor and air support units).
The threat from Georgia in the foreseeable future isn’t real, nor can it be too serious thanks to the very limited military possibilities of this country. Let us leave aside for now a latent potential for conflict with Japan and Turkey.
There are two obvious "big" threats - NATO and China. If Russia is able to fend this threat off, then any other threats can be ignored. Comparing the NATO and the China threat is very useful from the viewpoints of possibilities.
NATO Needs Tanks
Within the last few years the Russian media has written literally millions of words about the threat to Russia by NATO. If all of them to be analyzed, you'll find an interesting thing - the complete absence of concrete facts and figures. Perhaps that is why all relevant publicity campaign is conducted at very high degree, strongly resembling hysteria.
Although everything is much simpler, instead of clichés such as "NATO encircles Russia with their military bases" why do the media not just give a list of these bases and number of troopers in the bases? But they don’t do that for some reason.
If NATO is planning an aggressive war against Russia, it must build an offensive capability. Foundation ground offensive capabilities are traditionally the tanks.
If it is a classic war “army against army” with the occupation of enemy territory, then without tanks it’s impossible. That has been shown in all the classic wars, not only of the twentieth, but the beginning of the twenty-first century. For example, both the Iraqi wars, where the U.S by no means neglected the use of Abram’s tanks. On the contrary, “Abram’s” on a bridge in central Baghdad April 9, 2003 became a symbol of the collapse of the Hussein regime.
At the beginning of 1990, 16 NATO member countries had in Europe 24 thousand tanks, including the USA - 6 thousand, Germany - 7 thousand, at the beginning of 2009, 28 NATO member-countries had in Europe about 13 thousand tanks, including the U.S. - 90, Germany – 1400 tanks.
NATO ground offensive potential has fallen by almost half (although the number of member countries has nearly doubled), and it decreases steadily from year to year and it will continue. For example, by 2015, France will have 240 tanks (in 2009 there were 814 in 1990 - 1358), Bulgaria - 160 (in 2009, was 565 in 1990 - 2145). Slightly more than 200 tanks would remain in the near future in the UK, less than 500 - in Germany, once the “main strike forces of NATO in Europe.” In this case, all the NATO countries the production of tanks completely stopped.
But, of course, one could argue that nowadays more important than tanks is the airpower. The main offensive capabilities - air. But even here the situation is the same. In 1990, the 16 NATO countries in Europe had 5.6 thousand combat aircraft in 2009 in 28 countries- 3, 8 thousand; reduction is not as rapid as in the case of tanks, but not too small or too steady. And this reduction will continue. The UK in the coming years will have less than 200 combat aircraft (in 1990 there were 1200 planes), from Germany - less than 250 (it was more than a thousand). Europe has also significantly cut down future purchase programs (Typhoon and F-35).
In addition, the preparation of aggression involves the early deployment of the army near the territory of the potential victim. In another way, once again, yet nobody has been able to act. Confirmed that, for example, events in Yugoslavia in 1999, the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 and 2003. U.S. and its allies attacked Yugoslavia from Italy, and Iraq - from Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.
However, the past 11 years, the number of NATO members, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, 6 years - the Baltic States, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania what are near to Russia mainland are joined with NATO. But there are no groups and objects (those “NATO bases”) of any one of these countries have so far not appeared. Fighter base in Zokniai can’t be regarded as a real military base, even if falling into paranoia.
Finally, aggression is not possible without a systematic training of troops (ground forces). But no ground and air offensive operations, the scale of at least 10% - that which is required to carry out aggression against Russia, NATO have carried out since the end of the Cold War.
How can NATO prepare aggression by reducing the offensive capability, without deploying the groups against the direction of aggression, and without appropriate exercises - military science is not yet known?
There is also the factor of the psychological status of troops of the European countries, which they demonstrate in Afghanistan and other conflict zones. Europe society does not allow the armies of these countries to wage war, implying a really high level of losses.
Finally, we must remember the political aspect: if it comes to “big” war, “a NATO military” will sink into months of approval, NATO - is not one country, it’s 28 countries. And only in the pages of Pravda, all decisions are taken there “under the dictation of Washington.”
Very important is the fact that the West doesn’t have any purposes of aggression against Russia. It does not require living space, since they don’t have problems with overpopulation; the problem in Europe is more one of depopulation. And for resources, West (at least - Europe) is willing to pay money, but not willing to pay lives. Besides, the West can dictate to Russia the prices, because they are only buyers in the eastern region of Russia.
Esimene osa minu kirjutatud artikli seeriast, ilmuvad trükitul kujul Küprose ajakirjas "Observer"
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